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WHEN OPPOSITES ATTRACT:                                                                
IS THE ASSORTATIVE MATCHING ALWAYS POSITIVE? 
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ABSTRACT  
This paper shows that the positive assortative matching of Ghatak (1999) and Van Tassel (1999) is 
not a general result and always depends on the distribution of safe and risky types. Some new 
implications are: (i) borrowers may be better off by forming mixed groups. (ii) a mixed pooling 
equilibrium is possible when homogeneous pooling equilibria do not exist, and even when the 
reservation income of borrowers is equal to zero.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
This paper shows that the positive assortative matching as derived in Ghatak (1999) and Van Tassel 
(1999) is not a general result and always depends on the distribution of safe and risky types.  
In their seminal papers, Ghatak (1999) and Van Tassel (1999) show that joint liability lending 
always leads to a positive assortative matching in the formation of groups. Namely, in a population 
of two types of borrowers, safe and risky, safe borrowers will always choose safe partners and risky 
borrowers will consequently pair with risky partners. Risky types cannot induce safe types, through 
a side payment, to form mixed groups. The reason is that safe types value safe partners more than 
risky types as they have a lower probability of failure, and so of repaying for the other.  
In the present paper, to simplify the exposition, I follow and refer to Ghatak (2000) that studies the 
effect of the positive assortative matching on both the underinvestment setup of Stiglitz-Weiss 
(1981) and the overinvestment of de Meza-Webb (1987).1 Ghatak (2000) compares the expected 
utilities of borrowers in case they form either a homogeneous or a mixed lending group. In this 
comparison, he uses the same generic contract (individual and joint liability components offered by 
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1
 The theoretical results could be easily extended to all other similar contexts that consider the formation of groups 
through a self-selection mechanism. 
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a benevolent or perfectly competitive bank), to derive the payoff of borrowers under homogeneous 
and mixed groups. 
 In the paper, I argue that in Ghatak (2000) the payoff of mixed pairs should actually be 
based on a different contract. Specifically, the bank must offer a menu of two different generic 
contracts, one designed for homogeneous groups and one for mixed groups. In each of these 
contracts, the bank must break even, and so let borrowers choose the partners which maximize their 
expected utilities. This means that borrowers will compare the payoff they receive under 
homogeneous groups (based on the separating or pooling contract derived in Ghatak, 2000) with the 
payoff they receive under mixed groups (based on a contract opportunely designed for such 
groups).   
Some new implications are that:  
(i) borrowers may be better off by forming mixed groups. This occurs, both in the underinvestment 
and the overinvestment settings of Ghatak (2000), when borrowers cannot be separated and when 
the proportion of safe types is not high enough. The positive assortative matching, instead, still 
holds when borrowers receive a separating contract or when the number of safe types is sufficiently 
high under a pooling contract. The reason is that, when borrowers receive a separating contract or a 
pooling contract with a high proportion of safe types, safe firms reach their highest possible payoff, 
so it is difficult for risky firms to persuade them to choose a mixed group after a side payment. If, 
instead, borrowers receive a pooling contract and the proportion of safe types is not high, safe firms 
receive a payoff close to their reservation income. In this case, they could be induced to form mixed 
groups.  
(ii) a mixed pooling equilibrium is possible when homogeneous pooling equilibria do not exist, and 
even when the reservation income of borrowers is very low or equal to zero. We know that, in the 
underinvestment case of Ghatak (2000), safe types cannot receive a pooling individual liability 
contract since their expected net payoff is not enough to cover their outside option. However, their 
revenue in case of success is large enough to satisfy the joint liability constraint, so they can obtain 
a loan in a group-lending scheme. If, on the contrary, we assumed in Ghatak (2000) a reservation 
income low or equal to zero, we could have at equilibrium both underinvestment and no 
possibilities for group lending. The present paper shows that, in this case, mixed group can 
nevertheless exist and solve the rationing problem.  
It is important to note that the negative assortative matching described here, may arise in 
Ghatak (2000) as an implicit feature of his paper. Besides, this result does not depend on any 
additional assumptions. Indeed, it is well established in the literature that, in different contexts, 
negative assortative matching may occur in group lending. Guttman (2008), for example, shows that 
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the positive matching does not necessarily hold in Ghatak (2000) if dynamic incentives (such as the 
threat of not being refinanced if the group defaults) are intoduced. 
 Section 2 considers the case of underinvestment (Stiglitz-Weiss, 1981) where projects are 
classified in terms of a second-order stochastic dominance. Section 3 considers the case of 
overinvestment (de Meza-Webb, 1987) where projects are, instead, ranked in terms of a second-
order dominance.  
 
 
2 THE UNDER-INVESTMENT CASE 
 
2.1 The Ghatak (2000) Model 
This subsection will briefly review the basic underinvestment setup analyzed in Ghatak (2000). 
There are two types of risk-neutral potential entrepreneurs/firms endowed with two different 
investment projects, safe and risky. Both projects require a unit of investment. Firms have no initial 
wealth and therefore need an outside loan. 
The safe project yields sR  with probability sp . The risky project yields rR  with probability rp . 
Both types yield nothing in case of failure. As in Siglitz-Weiss (1981), assume that rs pp >  and 
RRpRp rrss == . There is a risk-neutral benevolent bank
2
 with an opportunity cost of capital 
equal to ρ . As regards the informational structure, firms know each other’s quality. The bank 
instead only know that, statistically, the probability of financing a risky type (the quality of the 
environment) is )1 ,0(∈θ . Assume that the final output produced is imperfectly observable, in the 
sense that the bank can only verify whether the project was successful or not, but cannot observe the 
exact amount produced. So, the final output cannot be related with certainty ex post to the 
borrower’s type (for example, a borrower could in theory conceal or invest elsewhere some of the 
final product). In this case, the optimal form of financing is the debt contract3.  
The bank can offer one of two alternative forms of contract: individual liability contract or joint 
liability contract. The individual liability contracts is standard debt contract with a fixed repayment 
sum (principal plus interest), r . In a joint liability contract, the bank asks the borrowers to form 
groups of two. Under this arrangement, a successful borrower, in addition to the repayment sum, 
pays also  a joint liability component, c , if the other borrower does not obtain a positive outcome.  
Ghatak (2000) assumes that  
                                                 
2
 The theoretical results would remain unchanged if we considered perfectly competitive lenders.  
3
 As pointed out by de Meza-Webb (1987), if the final returns were perfectly observable, the bank could reach the 
optimum also by offering a share finance contract. 
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,uR +> ρ                                    (A1) 
,u
p
p
R s +< ρ                      (A2) 
 
where rs ppp θθ +−= )1( , and  u  is the reservation income of both borrowers. 
The assumption (A1) guarantees that both projects are socially productive. However, under the 
assumption (A2), pooling individual liability contracts do not exist. So, the bank is restricted to 
offer joint liability contracts, when this is feasible.  
Under a joint contract ),( cr , the expected payoff of  a type i, when his group mate is j, is  
 
cpprRpcrRpprRppcrU jiiiijiijiij )1()())(1()(),( −−−=−−−+−= .        (1) 
 
Ghatak (2000) shows that, with joint liability, borrowers always form homogeneous groups. This is 
the so-called positive assortative matching result.  
His argument is as follows. Given the expected loss of a safe type from pairing with a risky mate,  
cpppcrUcrU rsssrss )(),(),( −=− , and the expected gain of a risky type from pairing with a safe, 
cpppcrUcrU rsrrrrs )(),(),( −=− , the difference of expected utilities can be written as  
 
)],(),([)],(),([ crUcrUcrUcrU rrrssrss −−− .           (2) 
 
The positive assortative matching of Ghatak (2000) stems from the fact that (2) is always positive. 
That is, risky types cannot induce safe types to form a heterogeneous group even after a monetary 
compensation.  
The generic contract ),( cr  that Ghatak (2000) uses to compare the expected utilities in (2) can be 
separating or pooling. The separating contract derives from the following bank’s zero-profit 
conditions on safe and risky groups, 
 
0)1( =−−+ ρsssss cpprp ,  and                (0piCss) 
0)1( =−−+ ρrrrrr cpprp .                (0piCrr) 
 
The pooling contract derives from the following bank’s zero-profit condition on the average group, 
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0])1([])1()[1( =−−++−+− ρθθ cpprpcpprp rrrsss .         (0piCPOOL) 
 
Note that in (0piCss), (0piCrr) and (0piCPOOL), the probability for the bank of receiving the joint 
liability payment is always based on )1( ii pp − , for rsi ,= . This probability does not take into 
account the fact that, in theory, borrowers may prefer mixed groups. 
All equilibrium contracts must satisfy a limited liability constraint. Namely, the outcome of a 
successful borrower must be large enough to pay both the individual and the joint liability 
obligations. That is, 
 
crRs +≥ ,                      (LLC) 
 
where we only have to consider the (lower) return of the safe borrower. 
Ghatak (2000) also considers two participation constraints for both types, that is,  
 
ucrU ss ≥),( ,  and                      (PCss) 
ucrU rr ≥),( .                     (PCrr) 
 
The aim of the benevolent bank is to choose a contract that maximizes a weighted sum of the 
expected payoffs of the representative borrowers, that is,  
 
),(),()1( max
,
crUcrU rrss
cr
λλ +− , 
 
where λ  is the social weight associated to risky types.  
Ghatak (2000) shows that, depending on sR (and so on the LLC), there exist either separating or 
pooling equilibria. If crRs ˆˆ +≥ , where )/()1(ˆ rsrs ppppr −+= ρ  and )/(ˆ rs ppc ρ= , that is, if the 
assumption 
 






+>
r
s
p
p
R 1ρ                       (A3) 
 
6 
 
holds, separating equilibria exist4.  If (A3) does not hold, pooling equilibria may exist under the less 
restrictive assumption  
 
pp
pp
u
p
p
R
s
rss
22)1( θθρ +−+> .                    (A4) 
 
 
2.2 A Possibility for Mixed Groups 
This subsection shows that in the model of Ghatak (2000), borrowers may in some cases pair in 
heterogeneous groups. 
As said, in Ghatak (2000), the mixed terms ),( crU sr  and ),( crU rs  used for the comparison in (2) 
derive either from (0piCss) and (0piCrr) in a separating equilibrium, or from (0piCPOOL) in a pooling 
equilibrium. In other words, these expected utilities derive from a contract that is based on the 
presumption that groups are always homogeneous. This also means that in Ghatak (2000) the 
reaction function of the bank to the possibility of mixed groups is not fully specified. 
In the present paper, I argue that the mixed terms ),( crU sr  and ),( crU rs  should actually 
derive from the following bank’s mixed zero-profit conditions  
 
0)1( =−−+ ρcpprp rss ,  and                (0piCsr) 
0)1( =−−+ ρcpprp srr .                (0piCrs) 
 
In (0piCsr) and (0piCrs), the bank takes into account that, whenever borrowers formed mixed groups, 
the joint liability component is actually cpp ji )1( −  and not cpp ii )1( − . That is, the bank must 
always consider a different contract, ),( MIXMIX cr , if the group financed is not homogeneous5.  
As a result, in the case of a negative assortative matching, the bank’s maximization problem is 
 
                                                 
4
 This paper does not consider the extension of the note by Gangopadhyay et al. (2005). There, the authors point out the 
fact that in Ghatak (2000) the amount of joint liability, c, exceeds the amount of individual liability, r. This could raise 
the problem that when one member fails, the group may announce that both members had success and pay just the 
interest-rate obligations.   
5
 In other terms, the problem should satisfy the complete formulation of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. This is 
true if the bank is either benevolent or in a perfectly competitive market. 
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),(),( max
,
crUcrU rssr
cr
+ , 
 
where, clearly, we do not have to consider a social weight for a specific group. 
With mixed groups, the possible financial contract is easily derived. The equilibrium is pooling and 
unique. Solving (0piCsr) and (0piCrs), we obtain  
 
rsrs
MIXMIX pppp
cr
−+
==
ρ
. 
 
Under mixed groups, we have neither separating, nor other pooling equilibria in addition to 
),( MIXMIX cr . This also means that the mixed contractual terms do not depend on the distribution of 
types. 
Two necessary conditions for the existence of mixed groups are: first, a participation constraint for 
each firm that takes into account the transfer/compensation that one type makes to the other6. The 
second condition is the limited liability constraint for mixed groups, that is, 
  
rsrs
MIXMIXs pppp
crR
−+
=+≥ ρ2 .              (LLCMIX) 
 
The two mixed terms ),( crU sr  and ),( crU rs  become  
 






−+
−
−=−−−=
rsrs
r
ssMIXrsMIXssMIXMIXsr pppp
p
RpcpprRpcrU ρ)2()1()(),( ,  and  (3a) 






−+
−
−=−−−=
rsrs
s
rrMIXrsMIXrsMIXMIXrs pppp
p
RpcpprRpcrU ρ)2()1()(),( .     (3b) 
 
The payoff in (3a) can be positive or negative. In the latter case, it would be more difficult to 
convince safe types to accept mixed groups as they would require a larger compensation. 
The difference (2) becomes  
 
                                                 
6
 It is not necessary to specify the heterogeneous participation constraints because they will be automatically satisfied if 
borrowers choose mixed groups and if the (PCss) and (PCrr) hold.  
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)],(),([)],(),([ crUcrUcrUcrU rrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss −−− ,                            (AM) 
 
that is, the assortative-matching expression that borrowers use to compare their payoff under 
homogeneous and mixed groups.  
The following proposition shows that the sign of the assortative matching in Ghatak (2000)  
may depend on the distribution of borrowers’ types. 
 
Proposition 1. In the underinvestment case, the assortative matching in Ghatak (2000), 
a) if (A3) holds, is always positive.  
b) if (A3) does not hold and (A4) holds, is positive if 21≤θ , and negative otherwise.  
 
Proof.  
a) In this case, the equilibrium is separating. The expression (AM) evaluated at the contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr  is 
equal to 0, so borrowers prefer homogeneous partners7. This is also true for all the other possible 
separating contracts because safe and risky types reach the same payoff. 
b) Pooling equilibria exist when the LLC is below the contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr . Write (AM) as 
),()]1()1([)(2 crcpppprppr rrssrs γ=−+−−+− .  
Write also the POOLCpi0  as ])1()[1(
]))(1[(
22
rrssrr
rrs
pppppp
rppp
c
−−−−+−
+−−−
=
θ
θρ
.  
This value of c , into ),( crγ , gives )()1()1)()(1(
])1)[(](1)1(2[
r
pppppp
rpppppp
rrrsrs
rsrsrs γ
θ
ρθ
=
−+−+−−
−−+−−−
. Starting 
from the contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr , where the difference in expected utilities is 0, we have that (AM) is 
increasing in r , along the POOLCpi0 , if   
0)1()1)()(1(
)](1)1(2[)(
0
≥
−+−+−−
−−−
=
rrrsrs
rsrs
C pppppp
pppp
dr
rd
POOL
θ
θγ
pi
,                       (4) 
that is always true if 21≤θ  (and if, as assumed in Ghatak, 2000, 1>+ rs pp  to rule out negative 
interest-rate repayments).                                                                     ■ 
 
[Fig. 1a and 1b  HERE] 
 
                                                 
7
 The implicit assumption is that, in case of indifference, safe types prefer homogeneous groups.  
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The intuition behind proposition 1 is straightforward. Under (A3), the equilibrium is separating and 
safe firms reach their highest possible payoff, ρ−ss Rp , so it is difficult for risky firms to 
compensate their heterogeneous peers if they agree to form a mixed group. If instead (A3) does not 
hold and (A4) holds, the equilibrium will be pooling. For example, fig. 1a and 1b depict the possible 
pooling equilibria in Ghatak (2000), respectively for a low and high level of θ . All contracts 
between points A and B in fig. 1a and between C and D in fig. 1b are optimal pooling contracts. If 
21≤θ , safe types obtain a payoff close to their first-best level (fig. 1a). So, again, it is difficult for 
safe types to be induced to choose mixed pairs. On the other hand, if 21>θ , safe types obtain a 
payoff close or equal to their reservation income (fig. 1b). In this case, safe firms need a relatively 
low transfer from their risky partners to accept mixed groups8. The actual equilibrium contract will 
depend on the social weight, λ , of risky types. For example, if 1=λ , the (lowest possible) pooling 
equilibrium is at the intersection between the bank’s pooled break-even line, POOLCpi0 , and the 
binding participation constraint of safe types, 0=ssPC  (point B in fig. 1a or D in fig. 1b). For such 
a contract, borrowers prefer homogeneous groups if (AM) is positive, that is, if 
0)](1)1(2[ ≥−−−−
θ
ρθ uRp ss
, that is true if 21≤θ  (since 0>−− ρuRp ss ).          
 
2.3 Low Reservation Income 
In Ghatak (2000), if the reservation income is low or equal to 0, we can observe a situation where 
there are both underinvestment and no possibilities for homogeneous group lending. This is 
equivalent to say that the LLC is below the point where the bank’s pooled break-even line and the 
binding participation constraint of safe types intersect (as point B’ in fig. 2a). This subsection shows 
that, in this case, heterogeneous groups can solve the rationing problem. 
Assume first that 0=u . In such a case, only risky types receive credit and the equilibrium contract 
is )0,( rpρ .  
The difference (AM) can be written as  
 
 0)],(),([)],(0[ <−=−−− ssrrMIXMIXrsMIXMIXsr RpcrUcrUcrU ρ ,       ( 0=uAM )
    
where the equilibrium payoff of safe firms in homogeneous groups is 0.  
                                                 
8
 An interesting feature not considered in the present model (as well as in Ghatak, 2000) is the fact that, if 21≠θ , the 
number of mixed pairs is limited by the proportion of one of the two borrowers’ types. In such cases, when all mixed 
groups already received credit, the remaining borrowers (either safe or risky) are forced to form homogeneous groups.    
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As ( 0=uAM ) is negative, borrowers will always choose to form mixed groups (they cannot form 
homogeneous groups). Besides, as risky types receive the same contract, )0,( rpρ , when the LLC 
is below the intersection of the bank’s pooled break-even line and the binding participation 
constraint of safe types, ( 0=uAM ) is negative for all possible values of u such that the LLC is below 
point B’. As a result, a pooling mixed equilibrium may exist (as point EMIX in fig. 2b) when pooling 
homogeneous equilibria are not possible. 
Clearly, the condition for the existence of a mixed pooling equilibrium is that the (LLCMIX) must be 
satisfied. We know that homogeneous pooling equilibria do not exist when (A4) does not hold. So, 
we only need to prove that (LLCMIX) is less restrictive than (A4). If 0=u , by comparing (A4) with 
(LLCMIX), it is 
ppppp rsrs
12 ρρ <
−+
 when  
 
)(2)1( rs
rsrs
pp
pppp
−
−−
≥−θ .                          (5) 
 
For 0=u , (5) is satisfied for a range of values of θ  (this range is increasing in u ). For example, if 
8.0=sp  and 4.0=rp , it is satisfied when 1.0≤θ .  
The reason why risky types prefer mixed groups, when u is very low or equal to 0, is that they 
would always receive the least favourable homogeneous separating contract. 
 We can summarize the discussion of this subsection in the following   
 
Proposition 2. A pooling equilibrium in mixed groups can exist even if the reservation income of 
borrowers is very low or equal to 0. 
 
[Fig. 2a and 2b  HERE] 
 
 
3 THE OVER-INVESTMENT CASE 
This section extends the overinvestment analysis of Ghatak (2000) and shows that, even in this 
case, the positive assortative matching is not a general result. 
Consider an environment a là de Meza-Webb (1987) with rs pp >  and RRR rs == .  
Assume also that risky firms are socially inefficient, 
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ρ+< uRp rr ,                   (A1’) 
 
and that they find it profitable to ask for outside financing, that is, 
 
u
p
Rpr >





−
ρ
.                              (A2’) 
 
In his paper, Ghatak (2000) is not much interested in the overinvestment case. He also chooses not 
to extend the analysis to pooling equilibria and shows that if the LLC is satisfied, that is if 
 






+>
rs pp
R 11ρ ,                                         (A3’) 
 
the optimal separating contract, )ˆ,ˆ( cr , exists. Under (A3’), joint liability lending can solve the 
overinvestment problem. 
 
[Fig. 3a and 3b  HERE] 
 
If R  is not so high as to reach the equilibrium )ˆ,ˆ( cr , other optimal separating or pooling equilibria 
may exist in this overinvestment scenario. We can distinguish two types of contracts. 
The first type of contract (separating) is characterized by the fact that the LLC is on or above the 
intersection between the bank’s pooled break-even line, POOLCpi0 , and the binding risky firm’s 
participation constraint, 0=rrPC , as points X in fig. 3a and 3b (which highlights a detail of fig.3a 
with a lower LLC). In this case, the equilibrium is unique and separating (risky firms are kept out). 
Depending on the extent of the LLC, the equilibrium contract can be above or below the intersection 
between the bank’s break-even line on good types, ssCpi0 , and the 0=rrPC  line (point Y  in fig. 3a 
and 3b). If the LLC is on or above, the separating equilibrium is where the LLC and the ssCpi0  lines 
intersect (as contract H  in fig. 3a). If the LLC is below point Y, the separating equilibrium is where 
the LLC and the 0=rrPC  lines intersect (as contract Z  in fig. 3b). Under both equilibria, risky 
types do not ask for a loan, so the difference (AM) can be written as  
 
]),([)],(),([ ucrUcrUcrU MIXMIXrsMIXMIXsrss −−− ,                 (AM’) 
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where the term ),( crU rr  is replaced by u .  
The second type of contract (pooling) arises when the LLC is below the intersection between the 
POOLCpi0  and the 0=rrPC  lines (that is point X’ in fig. 4a or X’’ in fig. 4b). For example, all 
contracts between point M and )0,( pρ  along the POOLCpi0  line in fig. 4a and between point N and 
)0,( pρ  in fig. 4b are possible pooling contracts. In this case, we need again (AM) and not (AM’) 
to compare homogeneous and mixed contracts, because risky types are not kept out of the credit 
market. 
The condition for the existence of a pooling equilibrium is simply 
 
p
R ρ≥ ,                                           (A4’) 
 
that is, the same condition that would arise in an individual liability context. The following 
proposition describes the composition of groups in this kind of environment. 
   
Proposition 3. In the overinvestment case, the assortative matching in Ghatak (2000), 
a) if (A3’) holds, is always positive.  
b) if (A3’) does not hold and (A4’) holds, is positive if 21≤θ , and negative otherwise.  
 
Proof.  
a) In this case, (AM’) evaluated at the contract )ˆ,ˆ( cr  is equal to rr Rpu −+ ρ  that is always positive 
since risky project are inefficient.  
b) If the LLC is below )ˆ,ˆ( cr  but on or above the intersection between the lines POOLCpi0  and 
0=rrPC , the contract is still separating. Consider first the contract X in fig. 3a or in fig. 3b where 
POOLCpi0  and 0=rrPC  intersect. For this contract, (AM’) is positive if 
0)1(
))(1)1(2(
≥
−
−+−−
θ
ρθ rr Rpu
,                                   (6) 
that is always true if 21≤θ . As (AM’) is increasing in ),( crU ss , this is also true if the equilibrium 
contract is either as depicted in fig. 3a or in fig. 3b, that is, for all the possible contracts between X 
and )ˆ,ˆ( cr . 
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If the LLC is below the intersection between the lines POOLCpi0  and 0=rrPC , all contracts between 
point X’ and )0,( pρ  in fig. 4a and X’’ and )0,( pρ  in fig. 4b are possible pooling contracts. For 
such contracts, we can use again the second part of proposition 1. For example, for 1=λ , that is for 
the contract )0,( pρ , (AM’) equals 





−+−
+
−
rrs
rs
ppp
pp
θθ
ρ )1(2 , that is positive when 21≤θ .    ■ 
 
[Fig. 4a and 4b  HERE] 
 
 
4 CONCLUSION  
The main contribution of this paper is to explain why the assortative matching in group formation of 
Ghatak (1999, 2000) and Van Tassel (1999) cannot be always positive or negative. The matching 
depends on the distribution of safe and risky types and, thus, on the contractual terms associated to 
each possible group formation. If the proportion of safe types is high, the contractual terms for 
homogeneous pairs will be relatively favourable. So, borrowers will end up choosing partners of the 
same type. On the other hand, if the proportion of safe types is low, borrowers may prefer mixed 
groups. This paper argues that the payoff of homogeneous groups under a particular contractual 
arrangement (separating or pooling) must be compared to the payoff of mixed groups under a 
completely different contractual arrangement.  
Another implication of the paper is that a mixed pooling equilibrium may exist when the 
reservation income of borrowers is very low or equal to zero. A reservation income sufficiently high 
is a key feature of the underinvestment section of Ghatak (2000). Indeed, with a high reservation 
income, it is possible to observe a situation where the participation constraint of safe types cannot 
be satisfied in a pooling contract and, at the same time, the revenue in case of success is large 
enough to satisfy the joint limited liability constraint. If, in contrast, the reservation income is low 
or zero, we can observe both underinvestment for the safe and no possibilities for group lending. 
This paper shows that, in this case, a mixed joint liability contract can nevertheless exist and solve 
the underinvestment problem.   
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